8. The UN Special Committee on Palestine

In forming the United Nations, the Allies made themselves permanent members of the upper chamber, the Security Council, and they gave themselves permanent veto power over any “substantive” resolutions. Initially, the countries given veto power were the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the USSR, France, and the Republic of China. France had been one of the Allies, but had been both defeated and occupied. (No French representative was invited to Yalta.) The Repubic of China, led by Chiang Kai-shek, whom the Americans hadn’t assassinated, was chosen though much of its fate had already been decided by the Big Three at Yalta.

Over time, the government of the (nationalist) Republic of China, which had escaped to Taiwan to flee the forces of Mao, was replaced by Mao’s People’s Republic of China (mainland communist China) in 1971. Not only was the Republic of China replaced on the Security Council, it was removed from the United Nations altogether. Mao’s China inherited the permanent veto so that it could protect its own interests, even if aggressive, from any Security Council action. The USSR devolved into the “Russian Federation” (1991), which then was given the permanent Security Council seat and veto.

The veto power in the Security Council insured that the United Nations would never take action against any future wars of aggression initiated by any of its permanent members. The permanent veto meant that these countries were free to pursue any wars of liberation or “just wars,” or anything else which served their interests, as far as the UN was concerned. That was its purpose, its only purpose.

In negotiations for the IMT, General Nikitchenko had asked, “Is it proposed then to condemn aggression or initiation of war in general or to condemn specifically aggression started by the Nazis? If the attempt is to have a general definition, that would not be agreeable.”¹ The UN Charter was written and its structure was set in place with full awareness that Stalin intended to initiate wars of liberation and wars to protect the interests of the Soviet Union. The Charter was written with full awareness that the other great powers would use their military force to protect their own empires. The wars in Indochina, in which several of the permanent members were involved over time, had already begun on December 19, 1946. The veto power was not given because of hypothetical considerations.

As the UN Charter, Chapter V, Article 24.1 states: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” Also to the point is the fact that Chapter IV, Article 12.1 of the Charter stipulated that: “While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”

The Charter begins:

“WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom…”

Yes, these were lofty goals, and lofty goals are always higher than lowly reality. But the expressed values and goals were clearly contradicted by the structure which was set in place. The “large” powers had their permanent veto in the Security Council, increasing their relative power against the smaller states. The Soviet Union had played as large a role as any country in the world in bringing “the scourge of war… [and] untold sorrow to mankind”.

In addition to his veto, Stalin also had absolute control of 5 of the 51 votes of the General Assembly.² These were the nations which the Soviets had conquered through war. The organized structure of the United Nations legitimized those conquests as well as the governments in at least a dozen other nations where dictators or elites ruled and denied “fundamental human rights… justice and respect… in larger freedom” to everyone else.

The Charter was not binding on the member states. They did not need to accept it, believe it, honor it, or embrace the values it proclaimed. They did not need to respect anything in it.

The Charter did not address the root causes of war nor explain how protecting the right of the Great Powers to initiate aggression would limit war. It did not explain how reserving all substantive issues to the Great Powers to decide (with the temporary members of the Security Council) made small nations equal to those which were large. It did not specify the standard of Justice which the organization embodied, for that too would have been irrelevant to all the nations in it where the will of the Ruler was the only thing affirmed to be the Law.

As successor to the failed League of Nations, the new “United Nations” inherited the same power dynamics, though some nations advanced and some receded. Instead of outlawing war by treaty, as the League of Nations had done, the new organization “determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. The words were shown to be empty by the successive wars that have taken place, one after another, since the words were written. Worse than empty, the words were camouflage for the same injustices and violence they pretended to abhor. They masked, but perpetuated, the false claims of authority. “The United Nations and international law were imagined as substitutes for power politics — while in fact they were simply new forums for it.”³

In May 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created to produce a recommendation for the type of government best suited to solve the problem in “Palestine”. The Committee finished its work on August 31, 1947. In less than four months the Committee was supposed to educate itself on the past few thousand years, grasp all the dimensions of the present conflict, and propose a plan which the UN could impose for a just and enduring peace. Rather than defusing or solving the problem, the UN inflamed it.

Like the League of Nations and empire after empire before it, the UN presumed to have the authority  to decide for others. In reviewing the British Mandate, the Committee reported that: “The present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the twofold authority conferred upon it by its impartiality and unanimity and by the Government of the mandatory Power itself.

“In its own statement of policy issued simultaneously with the report of the Royal Commission, the mandatory Power had found itself ‘driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs and those of the Jews in Palestine’ and ‘that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate…’ It is in the light of this background of deepening conflict intensified by the events of the succeeding ten years, that the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine feels it proper to view the working of the Mandate in Palestine.”⁴

The British Royal Commission recognized the authority of the Mandate, and the Mandate recognized the authority of the Commission, but how did either get the authority to decide for the peoples in the land? Neither “impartiality” nor “unanimity” within the Commission itself confer authority on it to decide for others. One cannot bestow authority on oneself.

Lord Balfour explained at the opening of the eighteenth session of the Council of the League of Nations: “Remember that a mandate is a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they obtained over conquered territories. It is imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers themselves in the interests of what they conceived to be the general welfare of mankind…”⁵

The British Empire, along with other powers, conquered the Ottoman Empire. Somehow that gave them the “right” to rule over the peoples whom the Ottoman Empire had previously subjugated. There is no mention of freedom or self-determination, only the assertion that the conquerors will rule in accordance with “what they conceived to be the general welfare of mankind”. Much of mankind, however, would rather be free to pursue what they themselves conceived to be conducive to their own general welfare. Power is not the same as authority, but Great Powers seldom recognize that.

Neither the Jews nor the Arabs gave the Commission or the Mandate authority over them. Though they differed with each other on many things, both Jews and Arabs saw the British Empire and the League of Nations as without authority in the land. Both Jews and Arabs maintained, and not without reason, that the Mandatory Power had violated the terms of the Mandate, broken its promises, and failed to serve the people in the land. Neither Jews nor Arabs accepted the purposes or authority of the Mandate.

“The Arabs have persistently adhered to the position that the Mandate for Palestine, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, is illegal. The Arab States have refused to recognize it as having any validity.“(b) The principle and right of national self-determination were violated.“(c) The Arab States were not Members of the League of Nations when the Palestine Mandate was approved, and are not, therefore, bound by it.”⁶

The Mandate was imposed on them. That is neither neutrality nor benevolence, but a presumption of superiority. The response of the peoples of the land to “the so-called Morrison Plan” was typical; as the UNSCOP Report stated: “The Jewish Agency rejected the proposal unreservedly. The Arab delegates to the London Conference also unanimously opposed the plan…. The proposal was unacceptable both to the Arab State delegations and to representatives of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee then present at the London Conference, and unacceptable also to the Jewish Agency.”⁷ Among other things, it was the presumption of the right to decide for others that was unacceptable.

Nevertheless, from the report of the Special Committee itself, it seems that at least some of its members were genuinely, humbly concerned with the peoples involved; and thoughtfully cognizant of the reasoned case that each side presented for itself. They were clearly perplexed by the competing claims, rights, and inflexibility of the opposing sides. They knew some of the history, but only from the outside.

The humility that is evident in the Committee report is what makes it valuable, both for its content and its methodology. The members were chosen by their governments, but the report shows none of the presumption that accompanies those who feel they have a right to impose their own values on others. The Committee members recognized their own limitations and seem to have wanted to help the Arabs and Jews involved to find a way to work together for peace.

The report begins by saying, “The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) has completed its task within the limited period of three months fixed by the General Assembly. This has entailed great pressure of work. Every effort has been made to avoid, as far as possible, unforgivable errors and lacunae. It may, however, be foreseen that defects will be discovered by those who have been studying the Palestine question for years.

“The problem of Palestine is not one the solution of which will emerge from an accumulation of detailed information. If such had been the case, the problem would have been solved long ago. Few countries have been the subject of so many general or detailed inquiries — official and unofficial — especially during the last decade. The problem is mainly one of human relationship and political rights. Its solution may be reached only through a correct appreciation of the situation as a whole and an endeavour to find a human settlement. In this respect, the opinions of members of an international committee who represent various civilizations and schools of thought and have approached the question from different angles may be of some value.”⁸

The introduction itself is of some value. “The problem is mainly one of human relationship and political rights.” The problem begins with how people perceive and treat each other. That, therefore, is where the solution must begin. But what qualified the Great Powers to teach anyone else how to treat others?

The problem was also seen to be one of “political rights”. “Political rights,” however, are rights which are gained through political processes. They are not the same everywhere, nor at all times. What they are and who possesses them is determined by whoever dominates the political process.

In this way, they are unlike “natural rights,” which one has by virtue of being human. If God has bestowed “rights” on all the Children of Adam, those rights cannot be overturned or abridged by inferior, transient “political” processes. They can, however, be denied, ignored, and violated.

The Committee recognized that it was necessary to “find a human settlement,” not a mechanical or legal one. Such a settlement would need to go beyond “natural rights” to “natural obligations”. No solution can be found in a review of what each party considers its entitlement without equal consideration given to what is required of each party. What are the recognized obligations required of every Child of Adam?

If the Committee had functioned simply as people seeking to serve in an advisory capacity to those directly concerned, then it might have enjoyed some success. As it was, however, the Committee was an extension of an organization that presumed authority to issue compulsory decrees to others. That, in part, is what placed its task, though somewhat well-intended, beyond its reach.

The report itself shows how ill-suited the organization was for the task. The report described how the work of the Committee began:

“At the first meeting of the General Committee, the representative of India questioned Sir Alexander Cadogan about a statement made by ‘an authoritative representative’ of the United Kingdom Government that, whatever the recommendations of the United Nations, the United Kingdom was not prepared at that stage to say that it would accept these recommendations. Sir Alexander Cadogan replied that the actual statement had been, ‘I cannot imagine His Majesty’s Government carrying out a policy of which it does not approve.’ This did not mean that the Government would not accept any recommendation of the Assembly, but only that it would not carry out a decision it felt to be wrong.

“The representative of the United Kingdom made a further statement in explanation of his Government’s stand at the fifty-second meeting of the First Committee. He said then, inter alia, ‘We have tried for years to solve the problem of Palestine. Having failed so far, we now bring it to the United Nations, in the hope that it can succeed where we have not. If the United Nations can find a just solution which will be accepted by both parties, it could hardly be expected that we should not welcome such a solution. All we say — and I made this reservation the other day — is that we should not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not accepted by both parties and which we cannot reconcile with our conscience.”⁹

The response of the representative of the United Kingdom seems fair enough. Yet it also seems understandable that the question was raised by the representative of India. His country had had two centuries of experience with what the British government was able to “reconcile with our conscience.”

Britain brought the problem of Palestine to the United Nations as a preface to its walking away from the Mandate responsibilities it had assumed. The UN decided to set up a Special Committee to study the problem and make recommendations. The first order of business was to decide what countries would be assigned to the Committee.

“Discussions on the composition of the Special Committee focussed primarily on the question of the inclusion or non-inclusion of the five permanent members of the Security Council. After a lengthy debate, the Australian resolution, providing that the Special Committee should consist of eleven members, not including the five permanent members of the Security Council, was adopted at the fifty-seventh meeting by a vote of thirteen to eleven, with twenty-nine abstentions….”¹⁰

At the fifty-seventh meeting of the First (preliminary) Committee, the composition of the Special Committee was decided. The key question had been whether or not the five permanent Security Council members should have direct representation on the Special Committee.They, after all, were the ones who would determine what course was to be taken. By a narrow vote, 13-11, it was decided that they should not have direct  representation. Twenty-nine countries chose not to vote at all, more than all those who did. It is hard to believe that they had no opinion as to what would yield a better result. The dynamics of the process were not based on human relationships.

The Special Committee was formed, and set about the task of gathering information to help them define the problem and formulate a solution. “At its fifth meeting (the first held in Jerusalem), the Committee was informed by a cablegram from the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the decision of the Arab Higher Committee to abstain from collaboration with the Special Committee.”¹¹ The Special Committee wrote to the Arab Higher Committee asking again for its cooperation. Its Vice-Chairman wrote back “that the Arab Higher Committee found no reason to reverse its previous decision, submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nation on 13 June 1947, to abstain from collaboration.”¹²

From the outset, therefore, there was absolutely no possibility of UNSCOP succeeding in its mission. They could recommend whatever they chose, but the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) did not want to collaborate with UNSCOP. It should not be assumed that the AHC should have cooperated with it. Who gave the UN authority to decide for the peoples of the land?

A little historical perspective, though not mentioned in the position of the AHC, may be helpful. Some sixty years earlier, “At the Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885, [King] Leopold [II] secured his own private colony seventy-five times larger than Belgium, as Europe’s leading powers carefully divided up the entire continent between themselves. Studying a 5-metre-high wall-map of Africa, the diplomats agreed on the ground rules for taking possession of its territory, and began negotiating the boundaries between their various colonies. And so concluded the final phase of the global process of European colonization that had begun more than 300 years earlier with Spanish and Portuguese explorers.”¹³

The European powers divided Africa among themselves without any consultation with or concern for its inhabitants. They did much the same in Asia and the Americas, though they sometimes fought with each other over who got what. For centuries, Europe’s leading powers thought themselves entitled to exploit the resources and peoples of other lands around the globe. For their own economic and political benefit, they subjugated multiple peoples who were not part of their nation.

And, since empires are not voluntary associations, substantial violence was often used in their establishment and maintenance. The subject peoples did not want to be subjected. The empire builders created various fictions to justify their military conquests, Those who establish empires see themselves as superior to their vassal peoples. They are guided by their own self-interest in deciding for those they have conquered.

The concept of empire is not a European invention. There were empires throughout the world long before there was a “Europe”. Some individuals are not content to merely rule a state; “the great ones” want to control more territory and subjugate more people. In their prioritization of values, power and wealth rank very high. With little restraint, the power feeds their pride and lust; the wealth feeds their pleasures and greed.  Such individuals devote their skill, strength, and time to pursue these ends.

Every inhabited continent has seen ruling empires. The names of some who ruled empires are familiar — Thutmose, Darius, Alexander, Augustus, Ming… The names of others have long been forgotten. It’s a long list — Egyptian, Persian, Mayan, Roman, Chinese, Macedonian, Incan, Mongol, Ottoman, Russian and Soviet… But the biggest was the British Empire. 

What kind of person would be convinced of their good intentions? or of their commitment to justice? By what right or authority do the Great Powers decide for the lesser ones, or for those without power?

About 400 years before the Common Era, Thucydides answered the question in his History of the Peloponnesian War. He describes how the powerful city state of Athens sent a military force of thirty-eight ships against the small island of Melia, to force the Melians to be subject to them. The Athenians violently plundered and devastated the island, commanding the Melians to surrender.

The Melian representatives observed that, “as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.”¹⁴ The Athenians responded, “you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹⁵ The Athenians went on to point out the mutual advantage to be gained in the Melian surrender: “ Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.”¹⁶  Thucydides presented an accurate description of the way the world works.

But in sum, the best that can be said is that a political organization makes political decisions based on the distribution of political power. In sum, the worst that can be said is that a political organization makes political decisions based on the distribution of political power. That is the equation by which political power operates.

The Special Committee itself was not trying to make political decisions. They were not power-brokers; they were seeking to function as advisors. They were trying to learn what they could, report their findings, and make some recommendations.

They first looked at the physical aspects of the land and said:

“1. The total land area of Palestine is estimated to be about 26,000 square kilometres or a little over 10,000 square miles, but about half of this area is uninhabitable desert.

“2. Situated at the cross-roads between Europe, Asia and North Africa, however, this small territory enjoys a geographical position from which it has derived, during much of its turbulent history, the ill-matched gifts of political strife and economic advantage.”¹⁷

Mark Twain had described his visit to Jerusalem in 1867, eighty years earlier: “The further we went the hotter the sun got, and the more rocky and bare, repulsive and dreary the landscape became. There could not have been more fragments of stone strewn broadcast over this part of the world, if every ten square feet of the land had been occupied by a separate and distinct stonecutter’s establishment for an age. There was hardly a tree or a shrub any where. Even the olive and the cactus, those fast friends of a worthless soil, had almost deserted the country. No landscape exists that is more tiresome to the eye than that which bounds the approaches to Jerusalem. The only difference between the roads and the surrounding country, perhaps, is that there are rather more rocks in the roads than in the surrounding country.”¹⁸

The Committee saw that the land lacked both natural resources and rainfall sufficient for summer agriculture. The Arabs mostly engaged in subsistence farming, and the Jews mostly in cash crops for marketing. The Committee concluded that, “Owing to its position in the Middle East, the further economic development of Palestine depends to a considerable degree on increasing its trade with other Middle East countries.”¹⁹

Though it was not difficult to see what was economically profitable, people had other, higher priorities. “In 1946 exports to Arab countries were adversely influenced by the boycott of Jewish products. Although it is not possible to determine how effective the boycott is, there can be no doubt that it could seriously hamper industrial development in Palestine if it were indefinitely maintained.”²⁰

Those who instituted the boycott valued something more than economic development. Neither the Mandatory Power nor UNSCOP clearly identify what that something was. “The view of the mandatory Power on Arab-Jewish relations was given by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on 13 November 1945, as follows: ’The whole story of Palestine since the mandate was created has been one of continued friction between the two races culminating at intervals in serious disturbances. The fact has to be faced that since the introduction of the mandate it has been impossible to find common grounds between the Arabs and the Jews.’”²¹

Perhaps the British Foreign Secretary was not looking in the right place. The Arabs and the Jews did occupy common ground in their opposition to the Mandate. They also had some common ground in those things that they valued more than economic development. As the UNSCOP Report observed, the Arabs have a defensible political position, and the Jews have a defensible political position. And the two defensible political positions are irreconcilable. That is why every attempt to find the necessary common ground in political positions will continue to fail.

“All the proposed solutions have aimed at resolving, in one manner or another, the Palestinian dilemma: the reconciliation of two diametrically opposed claims, each of which is supported by strong arguments, in a small country of limited resources, and in an atmosphere of great and increasing political and racial tension and conflicting nationalisms.”²²

The political details were, and are, secondary not primary. The Committee found that it could make recommendations that it thought logical and fair, but without any hope that they would be accepted by either side. Finding a framework for peace was the difficult but primary task, a task which eluded them.

“The most simple solutions, naturally enough, are the extreme solutions, by which is meant those which completely reject or ignore, or virtually so, the claims and demands of one or another party, while recognizing in full the claims of the other. The Special Committee has rejected such solutions…. It was relatively easy to conclude, therefore, that since both groups steadfastly maintain their claims, it is manifestly impossible, in the circumstances, to satisfy fully the claims of both groups, while it is indefensible to accept the full claims of one at the expense of the other.” ²³

The Committee could not find a way to get the two sides to work together or moderate their claims. But if a way were found, it was felt that “A federal State would provide the greatest opportunity for ameliorating the present dangerous racial and religious divisions in the population, while permitting the development of a more normal social structure…. A Federal State solution, therefore, which in the very nature of the case must emphasize unity and co-operation, will best serve the interests of peace….  The federal State is the most constructive and dynamic solution in that it eschews an attitude of resignation towards the question of the ability of Arabs and Jews to co-operate in their common interest, in favour of a realistic and dynamic attitude, namely, that under changed conditions the will to co-operate can be cultivated.”²⁴

If there were a way to form a federation, the Committee recommended that “The governmental structure of the independent Federal State of Palestine shall be federal and shall comprise a federal Government and the governments of the Arab and Jewish states respectively.

“Jerusalem, which shall be the capital of the independent federal State of Palestine, shall comprise, for purposes of local administration, two separate municipalities, one of which shall include the Arab sections of the city, including that part of the city within the walls, and the other the areas which are predominantly Jewish.”²⁵

That wasn’t possible then, and after more than 70 years of conflict over the established state of Israel, it is not possible now. But a modified form of these recommendations may be workable, if the common ground within the different Holy Scriptures becomes a foundation for peace.

On the 70th anniversary of the British exit from the Indian subcontinent, Al Jazeera published an editorial by Shashi Tharoor, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Indian parliament. The article said, “The British had been horrified, during the Revolt of 1857, to see Hindus and Muslims fighting side by side and under each other’s command against the foreign oppressor. They vowed this would not happen again. ‘Divide et impera was an old Roman maxim, and it shall be ours’, wrote Lord Elphinstone. A systematic policy of fomenting separate consciousness among the two communities was launched, with overt British sponsorship….

“The creation and perpetuation of Hindu-Muslim antagonism was the most significant accomplishment of British imperial policy: the colonial project of ‘divide et impera’ (divide and rule) fomented religious antagonisms to facilitate continued imperial rule and reached its tragic culmination in 1947…. There was an intangible partition, too. Friendships were destroyed, families ruined, geography hacked, history misread, tradition denied, minds and hearts torn apart”²⁶

There were reasons for the British to stop ruling India, and there were reasons to seek some division of the subcontinent, but the British government did not care for the peoples involved. “The task of dividing the two nations was assigned to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a lawyer who had never been to India before and knew nothing of its history, society or traditions.”²⁷ After two hundred years of British rule, they gave him five weeks to draw the map for Partition. After he did that, he never returned to India.

Two weeks after the British government partitioned India and Pakistan, it was ready to disengage from Palestine as well, without much regard for what that would bring to the peoples in the land. UNSCOP was given three months to accomplish its task. As was the case in the Indian subcontinent, the results have been catastrophic. That is likely to continue, but it may be possible to learn and apply some lessons.

FOOTNOTES

1. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, p. 23
2. Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, and the USSR.
3. Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2002), p. 439
4. General Assembly A/364, 3 September 1947, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Vol. 1, Lake Success, New York, 1947, Chapter 2.73-74.
5. Ibid., UNSCOP Report 2. 180.
6. UNSCOP Report 2. 160.
7. UNSCOP Report, 2.114, 116
8. General Assembly A/364, 3 September 1947, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Vol. 1, Lake Success, New York, 1947, Preface. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3
9. UNSCOP Report Chapter 1.11,12.
10. UNSCOP Report, Chapter 1.15.
11. UNSCOP Report, Chapter 1, Point 32.
12. UNSCOP Report, Chapter 1, Point 34.
13. Nick Middleton, An Atlas of Countries That Don’t Exist, (London: Macmillan, 2015) p. 11
14. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, epub 763.7 / 1208
15. Thucydides, epub 764.9 / 1208.
16. Thucydides, epub 766.4 / 1208
17. UNSCOP Report, Chapter 2
18. Mark Twain, Innocents Abroad, (Pilgrim’s Progress ) 1869, epub. 933.4/2255 ch. 52
19. UNSCOP Report, 2.55.
20. UNSCOP Report, Chapter 2.56.
21. UNSCOP Report, 2.122.
22. UNSCOP Report, IV. 13
23. UNSCOP Report, CHAPTER IV, THE MAIN PROPOSALS PROPOUNDED FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION, 17; CHAPTER V, RECOMMENDATIONS (I). 3
24. UNSCOP Report, CHAPTER V, RECOMMENDATIONS (I), 13,11,14
25. UNSCOP Report, RECOMMENDATION IX. ECONOMIC UNITY, PART III. City of Jerusalem
26. Shashi Tharoor, “The Partition: The British game of ‘divide and rule’: Before leaving India, the British made sure a united India would not be possible,” Al Jazeera, 10 Aug. 2017.https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/partition-british-game-divide-rule-170808101655163.html
27. Ibid.